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all these forms of loss are connected and mutually reinforcing. To take a closer look 
at Daesh is to rediscover a lack of democratic control over what is being produced 
and sold in the world, with the arms and oil trade as only the most obvious of many 
examples, to say nothing of the lack of any popular control over financial flows, whose 
opacity is as essential to multinational corporations as it is to criminal organizations. 
Even the very war now being waged against Daesh testifies to the imperial powers’ 
own unwillingness to confront the networks that support Daesh among their own 
allies in the Gulf states, illustrating a lack of democratic control over international 
relations.
If the response to a loss of control is to result in anything other than an aspira-
tion to another and deeper loss of control (for ‘us’ as much as for ‘others’), it needs 
to be demonstrated that the problem is precisely this lack of control in all its social 
and economic forms, without exception. This requires, in other words, a return to the 
old project of democratic control, on all fronts. The naked exercise of power that 
has brought Greece to its knees may at least have made the stakes clearer in this 
respect, in debates about austerity and the EU. But a similar breakthrough has not 
yet happened in other areas, for example in French debates over how to address the 
legacies of racism and colonialism, and the way these continue to obstruct the demo-
cratic project in general.
Encouraging and direct, a powerful reversal of the feeling of powerlessness requires 
inventing new truly democratic responses to acts of violence and war. We need to 
politicize this feeling of powerlessness and the factors that give rise to it, against 
those who produce it and cultivate it. If we fail, it will continue to be politicized only 
by and for them. This feeling haunts us, and most of the time we live with it without 
thinking about it. But we know that the time has come to confront it when, as in the 
aftermath of 13 November in Paris, we suddenly experience it as intolerable.
Note
An earlier version of this text was published online as ‘Guerre ou démocratie: politiser le sentiment 
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When the attacks of 13 November in Paris are used by the French government to 
criminalize activists and protesters, when fear is pushing its population deeper into 
the arms of the Front National, and when the radical Left has almost disappeared 
from the political landscape, can one retain any hope that the country will find the 
necessary resources to be true to its ideals? The answer I receive from most of the 
Anglo-Saxon world is ‘no’. Indeed, I hear, the ideals are themselves part of the problem: 
France’s self-representation as the beacon of the Rights of Man has hidden for too long 
the true nature of its society.
5In his France since 1945, for instance, Robert Gidea explains that the French 
Republic rests on four cardinal principles: a universal, secular, compulsory and free 
education; equality of all citizens before the law, whatever their class, race or gender; 
the indivisibility of the Republic, in which the laws are made by a single legislature, 
articulating the will of the sovereign people; and, finally, a contractual conception of 
the nation, as opposed to the German organicist conception of the nation as Volk. His 
examination of France’s actual policies leads him, however, to dismiss these principles 
as ‘the founding myths of the Republic [but] in fact they disguised, and were made to 
disguise, radical inequalities.’1
Following the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo killings, this republican disguise was 
then ripped to shreds in a series of articles that meant to expose the real nature of 
France and, taken together, to compose its true history. The violent nature of French 
secularism was traced back to its origins, with the French Revolution leading to the 
Terror.2 France’s self-representation as the beacon of human rights later justified 
imperialism and colonialism as a ‘civilizing mission’.3 Colonialism informed France’s 
attitude towards its postcolonial immigration, which was subjected to a forced process 
of assimilation.4 Hence the tensions surrounding Muslims, whose piety goes against 
the aggressive secularism enshrined in the principle of laïcité. ‘The French conception 
of the republic’, writes Tariq Modood, ‘has integral to it a certain radical secularism, 
laïcité, marking the political triumph over clericalism. … Islam, with its claim to 
regulate public as well as private life, is therefore seen as an ideological foe and the 
Muslim presence as alien and potentially both culturally and politically inassimilable.’5 
The terrorist attacks suffered by France this year were thus largely perceived as a 
predictable consequence of religious tensions generated by French republicanism. 
I cannot accept this analysis and will go so far as to make the reverse claim: not 
only do I refuse to give up on France’s revolutionary heritage, I even count on French 
postcolonial citizens to preserve it from the steady ideological degradation of the 
overall population. I may be deluded by my attachment to the Revolution, but my 
hopes are not entirely without reason. 
What leads young people to terrorism is a much debated question, but whatever the 
answer, I do not regard a handful of murderers as indicative of the state of French post-
colonial citizens. Jihadists aim to divide society along confessional lines: by committing 
crimes in the name of Islam, they hope to marginalize people of Muslim origins and thus 
radicalize them. For all we know, they could just as well have been committed because 
such terrorists felt that Muslims were not angry enough – just as far-left terrorist groups 
such as Brigade Rosse, Action Directe or the Red Army Faction turned to terrorism in the 
1970s because they were losing hope in the spontaneous rise of the proletariat. We must 
look elsewhere for indications on the state of mind of French Muslims.
In 2006 and 2009 respectively (after the ban on headscarves from schools in 2004 
and the first cartoon or caricature affair in 2005), Pew and Gallup led two extensive 
studies of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in European countries. 
On all counts, France was, often by a considerable margin, the country in which these 
relations were most positive, and Muslims happiest.6 
Many sociological studies belie the suggestion that Muslims are inherently alienated 
by republicanism. French Muslims tend to be ‘sceptical about collective identities, 
conceiving them as essentializing and negative. This attitude corresponds to the classic 
republican differentiation between public and private spaces, which is dominant in the 
society in which they grew up. Their ethnicity … plays out in the public space not in 
terms of a “right to difference”, but of the enforcement of equality and fundamental 
liberties; they do not wish to acquire more rights, but to enforce the republican pact.’7 
Such studies show that French Muslims are critical of the application of republican 
principles, but do not, however, reject the principles themselves. To understand the 
6persistence of the principles, we must envisage them from a different perspective to 
the one outlined above. 
Such is the centrality of the French Revolution to any perception of France that this 
is where we must begin. John Bowen’s Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves opens with 
the presentation of ‘two modes of thinking about religion that developed after 1789. 
One emphasized the importance of maintaining a national, public religion, whether as 
the Catholic Church or as the short-lived revolutionary cults of the goddesses Reason 
and Freedom. The second mode of thought emphasized the right of each individual to 
follow his own conscience.’ The first mode led to the Terror, during which ‘Robespierre’s 
rule was accompanied by persecutions of all religions.’ Therein lies the apparent root of 
France’s aggressive anticlericalism: ‘The Revolution, especially under Robespierre, had 
nourished and legitimated a strain of thinking that was strongly antireligious.’8 
One could plausibly argue that all analyses of France are determined by views of 
Maximilien Robespierre. Although it is far beyond the remit of this article to engage 
with the extraordinarily powerful historiographical arsenal that has hegemonized his 
‘black legend’, a few points must be made.9 
First, the belief that the Jacobin Republic abolished religious freedom in favour 
of a state religion is erroneous. The decree declaring France’s acknowledgement of a 
‘Supreme being’ was actually meant to put an end to religious persecutions by protect-
ing all religions under a common umbrella: freedom to adhere to any cult was reas-
serted in its eleventh article.10 It was not Robespierre and his circle who pursued an 
‘anti-religious’ policy; radical and divisive de-Christianization was the policy of their 
Hébertiste rivals and critics. Second, the routine reduction of Jacobinism to Terror 
leads to overlooking other debates central to the revolutionary period, which remained 
central to France’s republican self-perception: electoral suffrage, slavery, the economy 
and war. Against those who aimed to protect the rights of the propertied class by 
imposing an electoral franchise, justified slavery in the name of France’s economic 
reliance on its colonies, and thought that the Revolution should be spread to Europe 
by force, Robespierre demanded universal (male) suffrage, the abolition of slavery, the 
subordination of freedom of commerce to welfare, and opposed wars of conquest. The 
reader might be of the opinion that the fate of France (or indeed the world) would have 
been significantly better had Robespierre never spread his subversive ideas;11 what must 
be acknowledged, however, is that the distinction between the two modes of thinking 
originating in the Revolution cannot be construed as one between tolerance and 
intolerance. The Revolution also marked the origin of a tension between equalitarian 
universalism and nationalism. To dismiss the former as a mere cover-up for the latter 
leads to missing the beating heart of French republicanism. 
At the dawn of the Third Republic, this tension pervaded debates on colonization: 
the principles demanded that it should end, but their application would jeopardize 
the nation’s prosperity and power. Hence Jules Ferry’s attempt to pass colonialism 
as consistent with the principles of the Revolution, which led to the invention of the 
myth of France’s ‘civilizing mission’. He faced opposition from Georges Clemenceau, 
who vehemently rejected the claim that races could be hierarchized. 
Look at the history of the conquest of these people whom you call barbaric, and you will see 
violence, all crimes unleashed, oppression, rivers of blood flowing, weakness oppressed and 
tyrannised by the victors! Such is the history of your civilisation! … And it is such a system 
that you are attempting to justify in the country of the Rights of Man!12
Jules Ferry prevailed, and the school system he designed then ensured the hegemony of 
the myth in the metropole.13 
The late nineteenth century thus marked the high point of the nationalistic 
understanding of French republicanism. Its universalist version was, however, to be 
7reasserted by an unlikely voice: that of the founding father of Algerian nationalism. 
Messali Hadj had close ties with France: he had worked there and engaged with the 
French labour movement. When he called for the establishment of an Algerian parlia-
ment, in 1927, he cunningly implied that it was the only way for France to be true to 
the principles it had betrayed:
Only at that moment can we say that justice has been rendered to us; for in that way, we 
can effectively participate in the affairs of our country, and that day we will say that the 
democratic France of 1789, of 1848 … will have accomplished a work of civilization in eman-
cipating the Algerian people from exploitation, servitude, and injustice.14
Messali Hadj was addressing the Algerian Muslim Congress, which had been modelled 
on the 1789 Estates-General. References to the Revolution also abounded in the 
discourses of Ferhat Abbas, who would become the first president of the independent 
Republic of Algeria. There lies the origin of today’s French Muslims’ republicanism. 
The response of the Republic, however, was to deflect equalitarian claims by instru-
mentalizing religion.
France’s colonial policies are often analysed 
on the basis of two famous texts: Jules Ferry’s 
proclamation of France’s duty to civilize inferior 
races in 1885, and Frantz Fanon’s analysis of 
France’s strategy to dismantle Algerian society by 
emancipating its women, which led to the forced 
unveilings committed by the French army in 1954 in 
Algiers.15 The correspondence between these texts is 
so obvious that it is easy to conclude that colonial 
France always aimed to eradicate Islam. This, 
however, obscures an important part of the story. 
After the colonization of Algeria, the July monarchy 
implemented state control over Islam, aiming at 
‘the progressive depletion of the Muslim religion’.16 Yet ‘Orientalist’ scholars convinced 
the Third Republic to eschew ‘Islamophobic’ policies (thus was the term invented)17 
and instead promote religion so as to win over indigenous populations whilst keeping 
them under the control of carefully selected religious leaders. The most visible result 
of this new policy was the construction of the Parisian Mosque in 1918, as a token of 
gratitude to Muslims who had died during the war (the mosque was mocked by Hadj 
as a ‘publicity mosque’, mosquée de réclame. It is worth quoting from the inaugural 
speech, which contrasts strikingly with the Third Republic’s reputation for aggressive 
anticlericalism: ‘When the minaret that you are about to build will be erected, one 
more prayer will rise in the beautiful sky of Île de France, of which the Catholic towers 
of Notre-Dame will not be jealous.’18
The same strategies were applied when, after World War II, France endeavoured to 
reconstitute its decimated workforce with massive immigration from North Africa. 
Far from attempting to assimilate immigrants, the state parked them out of sight to 
prevent their integration into the ‘dangerous classes’, and was perfectly happy for them 
to take shelter from exploitation in religion. Such is the hold of the belief in assimi-
lationist France that this strategy is easily overlooked by historians. Robert Gidea, for 
instance, makes France’s intolerance towards minorities the guiding principle of his 
postwar history of France and writes that the practice of Islam demanded ‘a constant 
struggle':
North Africans organized a rent strike in Sonacotra hostels in 1975 in order to obtain prayer 
rooms. They petitioned at Renault-Billancourt in 1976 and went on strike at Citroën–
Aulnay-sous-Bois in 1982 to secure time for prayer during working shifts.19 
8What Gidea does not say is that companies were quick to grant the workers their 
wishes: cultural demands were cheaper to satisfy than others such as wages and safety. 
After the 1970s’ strikes, the government of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, eager to placate 
class tensions by implementing an ‘Islam of social peace’, developed a far-reaching 
plan to facilitate the practice of Islam in workplaces. Companies hoped that religious 
leaders would pacify their followers, and they did not mind dormitories and factories 
becoming the preserve of the tabligh or the Muslim Brotherhood.20 
This strategy was theorized by Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy, before he 
rebranded himself as a rival of the Front National. A dedicated advocate of multi-
culturalism, he boasted in La République, les religions, l’espérance (2004) of having 
nominated France’s first Muslim prefect, and insisted that ‘the school teacher could 
never replace the priest’21 because only religion could fulfil people’s deepest aspirations. 
Ultimately, all religions contained a convergent message of hope which enabled them 
to coexist harmoniously: during a visit to Riyadh, Sarkozy went so far as to claim 
that France and Saudi Arabia shared the common aim of ‘fighting against the decay 
of moral and spiritual values, against materialism and the excesses of individualism’.22 
These remarkable statements were the new garments of an Islam of social peace, and 
Sarkozy cynically recommended the promotion of religion in the banlieues as a means 
of turning disenfranchised youths away from criminality and drugs.23 The failure of 
Sarkozy’s strategy was exposed by the 2005 banlieues riots – or, rather, in the discourse 
of their actors, their ‘revolt’. The revolt had nothing to do with religion: it was an 
explosion of anger at social, economic and geographical relegation24 and had much to 
do with the spirit of the Revolution. Reminiscing on the revolt, Guy Achia explained: 
Our parents are Africans. Africans are respectful. Our African parents are always on time, 
always polite – very, very, polite: ‘yes sir, thank you ma’am'. But we are French … French 
people are revolutionaries, we are never happy, we never agree, we always complain.25
His fellow rapper Hardy Paul concurs: ‘We’re in France, it’s a revolutionary country, it’s 
in its history.’ That the revolutionary spirit is alive and well among French postcolonial 
youth also appears from the testimonies of French Muslim girls impacted by the law 
banning headscarves from schools: when they were asked what message they wished 
to address to French society, many simply reasserted the Republic’s slogan: Liberté, 
égalité, fraternité.26 French Muslims have never appeared more French than when 
opposing the French government. 
The debates on the headscarf were an opportunity for Muslims to reflect on 
the strategies that might help them fight prejudice. Many declared their will to get 
involved in politics, which, one girl argued, could create conditions that would trivial-
ize the veil. She believed that if Muslims and non-Muslims got together on issues of 
general interest, it would induce indifference towards religious identities by shifting 
the focus on ‘issues over territories, natural resources, or capitalism’. Non-Muslims 
would not be the sole beneficiaries of political socialization: Muslims, too, would learn 
to go beyond ‘simplistic’ beliefs such as ‘there is a conspiracy against Islam’ or ‘West-
erners dislike us because we are Muslims’.27 One could hardly find a better application 
of France’s self-representation as a nation founded upon a social contract and united 
by the search for the common good. 
That young Muslims refer back to the spirit of 1789 suggests that, pace François 
Furet, the Revolution is far from over. According to Furet, the fact that all govern-
ments now paid homage to the Revolution was a sign that the body politic had finally 
reabsorbed this uncanny lump, with only a light scar remaining.28 The Revolution, 
he claimed, had become ‘cold history’. Furet mistakenly believed that the significa-
tion of the Revolution could be fixed once and for all. Its ideals are peculiar in that 
they simultaneously found the nation and forbid its closure. In Ernesto Laclau’s 
9terminology, the hegemony of the revolutionary discourse is such that the state is 
forced to articulate its claim to legitimacy in its terms, yet as soon as opponents to the 
state integrate the principles, they acquire an ideological weapon that enables them to 
contest its legitimacy. Ultimately, French republicanism is neither really universal, nor 
merely nationalistic: it is dialectical and dynamic. The centrality of the Revolution in 
the French imaginary enables minorities, however small, to stand for France against 
the majority. 
Coda
In 1946, Aimé Césaire, the newly elected Communist deputy from Martinique, told the 
National Assembly that ‘a great hope [had] arisen for colonized countries: the hope of 
seeing a more just world, in which their duties would be balanced with an equal share 
of rights, be born from their sufferings and sacrifices’. Yet he also warned that 
on the day that these peoples have the sentiment that their hope is flouted one more time, and 
only on this day, will the situation become critical, because on that day, time and disillusions 
will have amassed, in the words of the famous Colonel Lawrence, … ‘dried-up souls ready to 
catch fire’. To this wildfire, let us prefer the great light that shines from the brasier you your-
selves lit in 1789, which has never stopped hovering over peoples’ horizons, because it brought 
all of them, regardless of their race and colour, … the great message of fraternity.29
Césaire’s warning was not headed. Souls are drying up indeed, and the greatest threat 
both to French minorities and to France as a whole is to be consumed by racial and 
ethnic conflicts. 
Recent cultural events testify to the vitality of the Revolution as a ‘site of memory’. 
Joël Pommerat’s forum-theatre events at the Théâtre des Amandiers, titled Ça Ira, 
enact the democratic surge of 1789, and Denis Lachaud’s recent novel Ah! Ça Ira! 
anticipates a general uprising led by disenfranchised migrants, banlieusards and 
intellectuals in 2040. By participating in the rewriting of the Revolution, post-colonial 
citizens do not renounce their identity but reclaim their past: as a universal event, 
the French Revolution remains a work in progress to which the contributions of 
Sonthonax, Toussaint L’Ouverture, Messali Hadj and Aimé Césaire are second to none.
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